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I. INTRODUCTION
A. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
This thesis addresses the biennial budget issue and how
it could affect the Department of Defense (DOD) budget
process. A Federal biennial budget is gaining an increasing
amount of political support. President Reagan has endorsed
the Packard Commission's recommendation for a biennial
budget. In the Congress, both liberal and conservative
Congressmen are also calling for a biennial budget. Though
there is much support for a multiyear budget, the individual
causes for this support vary considerably. While some see a
biennial budget as an opportunity to extend the budget
horizon and thereby allowing policymakers to take a broader
perspective on major issues, others view it as a chance to
increase the degree of Congressional micromanagement of the
Federal agencies. Others claim that the traditional annual
review process does not allow the Congress sufficient
opportunity to review and formulate a budget. Due to this
schedule pressure, budgets are then passed by policymakers
who are not aware of the budget's contents.
One of the alternatives that has been proposed to help
address these concerns is a Federal biennial budget.
Congress has already taken the first step in this direction.
The Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1986,
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directed the Department of Defense to submit biennial
budgets beginning with the 1988-1989 fiscal years [Ref.
l:Sec. 1405]. DOD complied with this direction and became
the first Federal agency to submit a biennial budget.
The biennial budget format is not new. Many states have
used a multiyear budget for years. Currently 21 states
utilize a biennial budget [Ref. 2:p. 3]. The specific form
and procedures vary widely from state to state. In recent
years, various Federal biennial budget alternatives have
been proposed in both the House and the Senate. For a
biennial budget to be of assistance to those in the
Department of Defense attempting to formulate and execute
budgets, certain key elements must be present. This thesis
will attempt to identify these key elements.
Since the late 1950s, Congress has become more and more
involved in the budget formulation process. The
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974 helped to
structure Congress 1 role in formulating and reviewing the
Federal budget by establishing a Congressional schedule and
process. It formally established two budget committees for
Congressional oversight and extended the fiscal year in
order to allow Congress nine months to review and formulate
the budget. Unfortunately, Congress has been unable to meet
its own schedule for reviewing and passing authorizations
and appropriations bills. Continuing resolutions at the
beginning of the fiscal year have become the expected. For
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fiscal year 1987, Congress passed an Omnibus Appropriations
Act covering all thirteen appropriations bills. This
apparent breakdown of the budget formulation process has had
a negative impact on the Department of Defense (DOD) budget
execution process. As the public perception grows that the
Congress is unable to deal with the budget process, pressure
will probably mount for a solution. Indeed, this may
already be occurring.
The purpose of this thesis is to determine the desired
attributes that a biennial budget should have from DOD's
perspective. The thesis will also attempt to identify the
potential benefits and problems that a biennial budget could
present DOD. The changes that have already occurred to the
Program Objective Memorandum (POM) development and budget
formulation processes as a result of the first multiyear
budget will also be presented.
B . RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question for this study is:
What effects will biennial budgeting have on the
Department of the Navy POM development and budgeting
process?
The following subsidiary research questions were
formulated to help define the primary research question:
1. What changes to the POM process has biennial budgeting
caused?
2. Under a biennial budget, how will the Five Year
Defense Plan (FYDP) be updated?
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3.
What second year review procedures have been or are
proposed to be implemented? For OP-90 (POM)? For 0P-
92 (Budgeting)? For Congressional oversight?
4. The Department of the Navy's budget office has
historically used rules for one year analysis; what
rules, if any, have changed under biennial budgeting?
5. How did the Department of the Navy approach the
biennial budget process of FY 1988-1989? How does
this differ from the approach to FY 1990-1991?
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
This study was limited to the effects that biennial
budgeting has had on the U.S. Navy's POM development process
at the OP-90 level. In addition to this, the effects on the
budget formulation process at the OP-92 and major claimant
(NAVAIR) levels were studied.
It is not known how Congress will deal with the first
DOD biennial budget proposal. It is possible that they will
authorize both years (FY 1988-1989) . It is very unlikely
however, that they will appropriate both fiscal years in a
single act. In any event, due to the current nature of this
issue, this study will be limited in some respects to
knowledgeable sources "best guesses" or estimates. In all
likelihood, the Federal biennial budget issue will not be
resolved for several years. This thesis will study the
biennial budget issue at the Department of the Navy level as
it is currently developing and attempt to forecast its




The general methodology utilized was to conduct a
bibliographical search using the Naval Postgraduate School
library computer. Information was also obtained from the
Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE) , and
the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) . The author
studied the literature resulting from these searches to gain
a current understanding of the biennial budget issue and the
Department of the Navy's (DON'S) POM development and
budgeting processes.
This was followed by a research field trip to
Washington, D.C. in February 1987 to augment the literature
review. Interviews were arranged beforehand with officials
at OP-90, OP-92 and NAVAIR. Congressional staff members
were also interviewed. These interviews were the primary
means of researching the key issues.
Following the research trip, the information gathered
was studied and interpreted. Follow-up telephone interviews
were conducted to further refine the results of the field
trip. Thesis advisor input was utilized throughout the
research effort to generate key questions and to help focus
the study
.
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
The thesis is organized into five chapters.
Chapter I: Introduction—This chapter provides a broad
introduction, identifying the purpose of the thesis and its
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scope and limitations. The Methodology used to collect the
data and how they were analyzed is also presented.
Chapter II: Background—A biennial budget background
from an historical perspective is presented. The biennial
budget's advantages and disadvantages are identified and the
forces that are causing the current discussion of a biennial
budget are studied. This is followed by the various common
biennial budgeting alternatives and their implementation
ramifications on DOD and the Congress. The chapter
concludes with which alternative seems to be the preferred
choice from DOD's perspective.
Chapter III: The Move Towards a Biennial Budget—This
chapter studies the gradual movement towards a biennial
budget at the Federal level. This trend "begins" with the
causes and provisions for revising the Multiyear Procurement
Plan (MYP) that became law in 1982. The implementation
policy and procedures for the DON'S first biennial budget
submission (for FY 1988-1989) and the policy and procedures
DON is currently using for its second biennial submission
are studied. This study is done at the OP-90, OP-92, and
Major Claimant (NAVAIR) level of interest.
Chapter IV: The Effects of the Move—The effects of the
changes that biennial budget planning has or may cause at
the OP-90, OP-92 and the Major Claimant level are
considered. Specifically the changes to the POM development
process, FYDP update, and changes to the budget formulation
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procedures at OP-90 and the Major Claimant are studied. The
review procedures that are being discussed for the second
year of the biennial budget are also discussed. The chapter
concludes with how DON is formulating various budgetary-
planning actions, in an attempt to anticipate Congressional
action on the biennial budget.
Chapter V: Conclusions—A discussion of the conclusions
drawn from the study are presented.
The intent of the thesis is to provide the reader with a
current understanding of the issues and the debate that
surrounds the biennial budget issue. The implementation of
a biennial budget involves much more than simply enacting a
systematic revision to the budget formulation process. It
already has caused some changes in how DOD formulates the
budget. Depending how Congress responds, the biennial
budget could have a far reaching impact on how all Federal




This chapter provides a background to the biennial or
multiyear budget. The commonly cited advantages and
disadvantages are first presented. This is followed by a
discussion of the forces that are causing support for the
biennial budget at the Federal level and some of the
obstacles that are standing in the way of its implementa-
tion. The common biennial budgeting alternatives are then
presented along with a discussion of their implementation
ramifications on DOD and the Congress. The alternative that
seems to be favored from DOD's perspective is identified.
The biennial budget is not a new concept. In 1940 there
were 44 states that had a biennial budget. Currently, there
are 21 states using a biennial budget of some form or
another. The primary reason given for shifting to an annual
cycle is that an annual cycle allowed the legislatures to
respond more effectively to changing conditions. It reduced
the number of supplemental appropriations. [Ref. 2:p. 3]
B. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
Advocates of the biennial budget cite the following
advantages to a biennial budget:
1) It would improve program funding stability. This, in
turn, would reduce funding level uncertainty providing
economies of scale and program efficiency.
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2) A two year budget cycle would allow more time for
Congress to review the budget proposals. This would
provide more thoughtful consideration of budget
matters and a more systematic planning, review, and
evaluation process. It is felt by many that the
current schedule is too tight and does not allow
careful review.
3) Congress would be provided more time to spend on non-
budget activities. Currently, the budget review
function dominates the Congressional schedule. By the
same token, less time would be spent by agency heads
and program administrators justifying programs
(advocacy) before Congress. More time could then be
spent administering programs by the agency.
4) Biennial budgeting could allow Congress to take a
broader view, permitting more time for oversight.
5) It could eliminate the problems of operating under a
continuing resolution. It would, if nothing else, cut
the need for continuing resolutions in half.
6) It could eliminate the overlap between the
authorization and appropriations processes. In recent
years, these processes have overlapped to the degree
that appropriation marks are sometimes available
before the authorization levels have been determined.
[Ref. 3:p. 13]
7) The present process is too confusing and difficult to
manage.
The commonly cited disadvantages to a biennial budget
include the following:
1) A two year budget would reduce the level of
Congressional control over the budget. Many members
of Congress, particularly the Appropriations
Committees, are currently unwilling to "lose control"
of the second year of a biennial budget. The current
system gives Congress more control over national
policy.
2) Budget estimates for a two year budget would be less
reliable than for an annual budget. Currently, by the
time Congress passes a DOD budget request, budget
estimates made in the programming phase can be up to
28 months old. A two year budget would make some of
these estimates up to 40 months old. A reasonable
issue is whether those developing budget estimates
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would be involved in budgeting or long range planning
[Ref. 4].
3) Since budget estimates would be less reliable,
increased flexibility would be required. Greater
transfer authority, and higher programming thresholds
would be needed. It is unlikely that Congress would
be willing to raise these thresholds making program
management difficult.
4) Currently, when a new Congress and a new President are
elected, they inherit eight months of a budget passed
by their predecessors. Under a biennial budget, it is
possible that 20 months of a budget would be
inherited. If the election had indicated a need for
reorganizing national priorities, the budget could and
probably would be amended by a supplemental
appropriation. This would disrupt the major advantage
to a biennial budget; program stability.
5) Congress would lose some flexibility to respond to
economic shifts in a macro-economic sense. If a
change in economic policy was required, supplemental
appropriations and budget amendments would be passed.
This would once again undermine program stability.
6) From DOD's perspective there could be a loss of
program implementation flexibility. It would be
increasingly difficult to respond to technological
advances or the constantly evolving strategic threat.
Decision makers could have difficulty starting new
programs in mid cycle. A bias could be established in
favor of older more established programs at the
expense of newer, more innovative ones.
7) The requirement for annual appropriations may help to
"keep the process moving." If the schedule were
changed to a biennial schedule, the process could
become even further bogged down as the pressure to
pass appropriation legislation was reduced to every
other year.
8) From DOD's perspective, increased Congressional
oversight may be defined as increased micromanagement.
Whether the advantages of a biennial budget outweigh the
disadvantages depends on what form a Federal biennial budget
takes. It also depends on the perspective taken. What is
cited as an advantage for Congress, could be a significant
19
disadvantage for DOD. For DOD to realize the full potential
benefits that can be accrued from a biennial budget,
Congress needs to make some changes in its approach to the
review and oversight process. A discussion of these
relevant issues follows.
C. CAUSES FOR SUPPORTING A BIENNIAL BUDGET AND OBSTACLES
TO ITS IMPLEMENTATION
Recently, Caspar Weinberger, the Secretary of Defense,
stated the Department's position on the issue:
The two-year budget could help forge a new and strong
commitment to our defense effort. It will permit Congress
to concentrate on broad policy choices, priorities, and
oversight reviews. Industry will be able to achieve lower
costs. And our overall efforts at making available
resources go farther will be greatly enhanced . . . the
two year budget request, which Congress directed, is a
vital first step in sustaining steady, modest growth over
the long term. The Congress has a great opportunity to
take a long-term view of budgetary commitments, their
effect on future resources and policy decisions, and the
relationship between strategy and resources. [Ref. 5:p.
B-2]
Congress has been refining its approach to its oversight
and review of the budget process for several years. One of
the more substantive bills passed was the Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974. In his book, The Guide
to the Federal Budget. Fiscal 1987 . Stanley Collender
identifies several reasons why Congress passed this act.
One of the basic reasons was that Congress did not have
sufficient time to review and pass authorization bills [Ref.
6: p. 14]. The bill changed the beginning of the fiscal year
from July 1 to October 1 thus increasing the review period
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from six to nine months. A look at Table 1 shows that the
extension of the fiscal year did little to resolve this
problem. Congress has not passed a DOD appropriation act
prior to the beginning of the fiscal year since 1977.
TABLE 1
DATES OF ENACTMENT; DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
APPROPRIATIONS ACTS FY 1977-FY 1987
Fiscal Year Effective Date Public Law Design.
1977 22 September 1976 P.L. 94-419
1978 21 September 1977 P.L. 95-111
1979 13 October 1978 P.L. 95-457
1980 21 December 1979 P.L. 96-154
1981 15 December 1980 P.L. 96-527
1982 29 December 1981 P.L. 97-114
1983 21 December 1982 P.L. 97-377.
1984 8 December 1983 P.L. 98-212
1985 12 October 1984 P.L. 98-473
1986 9 December 1985 P.L. 99-190
1987 17 October 1986 H.J. Res 738
Fiscal Years 1977-1986 [Ref. 7:p. 4]
Fiscal Year 1987 [Ref. 8:p. 2584]
Format [Ref. 7: p. 4]
One of the factors that hinders Congress' ability to
adhere to its own time schedule is the complexity of the DOD
budget. Annual authorization ani appropriation requires six
different Congressional committees to review a "defense
budget each year, comprising about 2,000 procurement line
items, and about 1,000 items in research and development"
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[Ref. 9:p. 27]. Some contend that nine months is simply
insufficient time to review such a huge budget because the
. . . the frenetic rush of funding means that many
programs are rarely, if ever, carefully evaluated.
Congress lacks the time to collect and review all the
relevant information for programs that must be authorized
annually. In fact, while Congress spends little time in
review and oversight of entitlement programs, these
programs now account for more than half the federal
budget. [Ref. 10:p. 3]
Prior to 1959, Congressional oversight of defense policy
consisted of broadly defined defense authorization bills and
then a more detailed review by the Appropriations
Committees. Annual authorizations were used rarely; they
covered only two programs: military construction and
foreign assistance. It was through the Authorization
Committees' annual hearings on military construction that
the committees came to realize how much military strategy
and budgetary authority had been given to the Executive
branch and the Appropriations Committees. [Ref. 11 :p. 27]
Since then, annual authorization has become the norm and
there has been increasing conflict between the Authorization
Committees and Appropriation Committees. It has evolved to
the point where it is not uncommon for bills to be
appropriated before they are authorized. This places DOD in
the difficult circumstance of being caught in a dispute
between two powerful Congressional committees. Although not
legally bound to do so, DOD's policy in this situation is to
not obligate the funds until the Authorization Committees
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have formally authorized the program's funding level [Ref.
12] .
The provisions of the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 called for multiyear
authorizations. Section 607 required that requests for new
program authorization be submitted for at least the first
two fiscal years of the program. The intent was to "develop
a pattern for the enactment of authorizing legislation at
least one year in advance of the fiscal year to which it
first applies." [Ref. ll:p. 25] This would seem to be a
step towards biennial budgeting. It certainly seems to
serve the original purpose of the Authorizing Committees; to
set program funding levels for the Appropriations
Committees. The second year's authorization figure would
also serve as a "target figure" for the development of a
succeeding budget. Unfortunately, little if any attention
has been paid to this provision of the Budget Act.
In a speech on the Senate floor, Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA)
spoke on his concerns about the way Congress handles the
defense budget. He stated:
. . . the burdens of the annual authorization process has
produced two specific problems: it has led to a triviali-
zation of Congress' responsibilities for oversight and has
led to excessive micromanagement. Last year we directed
the Navy to pare back its request for parachute flares,
practice bombs, and passenger vehicles . . . and had the
Air Force cut its request for garbage trucks, street
cleaners and scoop leaders.
He concluded saying that members of Congress and their
staffs are "acting more and more like national program
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managers in their oversight of defense and . . . focusing on
grains of sand on the beach while we should be looking over
the broad ocean and beyond." [Ref. 13: pp. 197-198]
In a companion speech the same day, Senator Barry
Goldwater (R-AZ) stated that the current budget / process
"drives us to use continuing resolutions which disrupt
stable long term planning in DOD, forcing it to begin each
fiscal year without knowing the level of funds that it has
available or the limitation placed on those funds." [Ref.
13 :p. 197] Beginning each fiscal year with an unknown level
of funding has had a disruptive influence on DOD's
acquisition process. It is common for the program manager
to begin the fiscal year not knowing the level of funding
that will be appropriated. This creates a high level of
uncertainty in the acquisition of major weapons systems.
Additionally, the budget is formulated in a very thoughtful
and deliberate process. As Congress feels the pressure,
however, to pass the required appropriations bills,
indiscriminate cuts are sometimes made. This can contribute
to program instability, loss of economic order quantities
and economies of scale.
Unfortunately, continuing resolutions have become the
norm. Their original intent was to provide a means for an
agency to continue operating while Congress reviewed and
passed the particular appropriation act under consideration.
They have become the vehicle for passing appropriations
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acts. In 1987, Congress passed a single Omnibus
Appropriations Act instead of the thirteen they are
"required" to review and pass. This collapse of the
Congressional role in budgeting undermines the effectiveness
of the entire budget formulation process and negatively
impacts those trying to administer programs.
The following is a description of the floor action on
the FY 1987 Omnibus Appropriation Act:
. . . Action on H.J. Res 738, provided all the complaints
common to continuing resolutions . . . that members did
not know what was in the bill, that its amendments made
policy outside the normal legislative process, and that
all but Appropriations Committee members were excluded
from decision. When the House acted on 15 October, the
only complete copy of the conference agreement appeared to
be an untidy, two foot high stack of papers bound by
string, resting on a desk near Appropriations Committee
Chairman Jamie L. Whitten [D-Miss] . The Daily
Congressional Record, lagging by several days because of
end of session printing pressures, carried little debate
and no data on the agreement immediately following the
House and Senate action. [Ref. 8:p. 2585]
The Packard Commission recognized this deficiency. The
commission recommended that the current budget process be
amended to include a biennial budget. Some of their major
revision recommendations can be summarized as follows:
1) The Secretary of Defense should recommend appropriate
military strategy and options to the President with a
corresponding five year defense budget level. This
would provide the President an opportunity to select a
defense program based on realistic funding estimates.
2) The President would then select and approve a five
year defense program with its associated budget
constraints. (In this context, the five year defense
program is not the same document as the Five Year





3) The Secretary of Defense would then utilize the
guidance provided in the approved five year plan to
develop a biennial budget.
4) Congress should then institute biennial budgeting by
authorizing AND appropriating both years (not each
year separately) . Congress should also limit their
oversight of the defense budget to operational
concepts and major issues, not line item detail.
Finally, Congress "should adopt milestone
authorization for major weapon systems. In addition
to using major system baseline techniques, Congress
should extend a multiyear funding for such approved
major programs as much as possible." [Ref. 14: pp.
493-494]
The conclusions that can be drawn from the Packard
Commission recommendations are clear; to maximize
efficiency, the acquisition and procurement of major weapons
systems must be tied to a long range funding horizon linked
with a long range commitment to a national defense program.
To complement this, Congressional oversight should be
expanded and given a broader focus.
Another factor that has contributed to confusion and
complicated the oversight process is a lack of trust that
Congress has with respect to DOD. In his book, The Politics
of the Budgetary Process , Aaron Wildavsky identifies trust
as a key ingredient of the budget formulation process. The
complexity of the Federal budget requires that the
legislature trust the individual agencies. This has
historically been one of the "calculation aides" that has
been used to reduce the complexity of formulating the budget
[Ref. 15:p. 74]. As the amount of trust has declined,
however, the degree of Congressional micromanagement has
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increased dramatically. Widely publicized stories of the
$450 hammer and $600 toilet seat, though they do not take
into full account the causes of these inflated prices, add
fuel to the fire. This erosion of confidence has
transformed the budget formulation process into such a
cumbersome process that many argue that the current system
is totally ineffective.
Some believe that Congress will not adhere to any time
schedule, multiyear or not, until there is sufficient public
pressure for it to do so. It is not merely an issue of
insufficient time and too complex a system. The Emergency
Deficit Reduction Control Act of 1985 revised the
Congressional budget schedule. It eased some of the
requirements that the Budget Act of 1974 set. The new
timetable (Table 2) requires adoption of one resolution
instead of two and an earlier budget submission by the
President to allow Congress additional time. The Act set
"firm" dates that budget activities "must" be accomplished
by. Some required action that must be accomplished before
Congress can recess for holidays. To date, the timetable
has been ignored as Congress has proceeded at its own pace,
recessing as it sees fit. The budget is so complicated and
the DOD budget so political and controversial, that tough
decisions on tough issues are put off until the last minute.






































Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act (GRH) as simply a vehicle for
Congress to avoid making some of these difficult decisions.
The Gramm-Rudman-Hol lings bill is considered by some to
be an obstacle to implementing the biennial budget. . It
tends to exacerbate the disadvantages and to minimize the
advantages of a biennial budget. In March 1986, following
the passage of the act, a study within the Department of the
Navy was done to assess its potential impact on the biennial
budget proposal. Some of the study's key findings follow:
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1. Stability—Program stability has been identified as
one of the major advantages that a biennial budget
would provide. In light of GRH, it is increasingly
unlikely that Congress would be willing to appropriate
funds for two years if there was reason to believe
that the automatic cutting mechanism would be
triggered. This would cause an unknown amount of
funds to be cut, disrupting program stability.
Secondly, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings is an inherently
destabilizing influence in procurement, research &
development, and military construction accounts. Any
funds obligated for a program are subject to being cut
for as long as those funds are available.
2. Flexibility—The mirror image of stability is
flexibility. For a biennial budget to be effective
from a budgeteer's perspective, program flexibility
would have to be improved. In this sense, program
flexibility is defined in terms of increasing
reprogramming thresholds and transfer authority.
Since Gramm-Rudman-Hollings uses a mechanical formula
to make reductions, it would probably reduce the
flexibility we already have to move funding between
programs
.
If Congress did indeed appropriate both years of
the biennium in a single appropriation act, most of
the procurement, research & development (R&D) , and
military construction (MILCON) funds would be
obligated in the first year of the biennium. This
would leave operations & maintenance (O&M) and
military personnel (MILPERS) accounts open to absorb
most of the GRH cuts.
3
.
Time for Planning—One of the advantages to a biennial
budget is that it would provide increased opportunity
for more thoughtful, systematic, planning and
evaluation. Time made available for these areas would
be lost to the increased management attention required
to implement the cuts mandated by GRH. [Ref. 19: pp.
1-2]
The Department of Defense biennial budget request was
the only one included in the President's January 1987 budget
proposal. All other Federal agencies submitted annual
requests. It is difficult to imagine how Congress can
seriously consider the second year of DOD's budget when they
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are looking at only a piece (albeit a major piece) of the
Federal budget and not the budget in its entirety for FY
1989. The budget is not a static document but a dynamic
statement of national priorities and objectives. How can
only a portion of these issues be considered and not the
others? In the course of a discussion about this issue, a
Congressman's aide said: "That is not a problem, Congress
can always cut the funds in the second year." This is a
convenient solution for the Congress but certainly not a
viable alternative from a budget administrator's
perspective.
D. ALTERNATIVE BIENNIAL BUDGET PROPOSALS
Since the 97th Congress, there have been several
biennial budget bills introduced in Congress. In the 98th
Congress there were four bills, in the 99th, five bills and
so far in the 100th there have already been three bills
proposed [Ref . 20] . The biennial budget seems to be gaining
support in the Congress. An increasing number of
influential Congressmen are supporting them. All of the
bills introduced, if enacted, would change the Congressional
timetable to develop the budget. The features that
distinguish the bills are whether there would be two
appropriation bills or one, and in which session the
legislation would pass. The more highly regarded bills will
now be discussed.
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Congressman Leon Panetta (D-CA) has introduced a version
of a biennial budget in the last three sessions of Congress.
This bill would authorize and appropriate funds for the full
biennium in a single appropriation act. What distinguishes
his bill from the other popular biennial budget reform bills
is the sequence of events.
The Panetta bill would provide for Congressional
oversight in the first session of a new Congress with the
budget formulation activities occurring in the second
session.
1st Session 2nd Session
! ! x
Oversight Budget action
The passage of a single appropriation act covering two
years is an essential ingredient of a biennial budget from
DOD's perspective. Some argue, however, that Congressman
Panetta' s proposal has two important weaknesses.
First, the new Congress and a new President would
inherit 20 months of a previous Congress' (and President's)
budget. After an election when it is made clear that the
people want a change in public policy, the newly elected
members would want to respond. It is unlikely that the
elected members would want to wait (nor would the people
want them to wait) 20 months to do so. More than likely, a
supplemental emergency authorization and appropriation act
would be passed in the first session. This, though
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responding to the people's will, would eliminate the primary
benefit of a biennial budget: providing program stability.
Secondly, Congressman Panetta's bill would also cause
Congress to make difficult budget decisions in an election
year, the year when it is most unlikely for them to make
tough political decisions. This, together with an
understandable desire to be on the campaign trail, make the
second session an unlikely one to complete budget action.
Another popular bill is one that Senator Roth (R-Del)
introduced in the 98th Congress (S. 20) . In the 99th
Congress, Congressman Hutto (D-FL) and Congressman Aspin (D-
WI) introduced a bill very similar to Senator Roth's bill
(H.R. 748) . In the 100th Congress, Senators Roth, Domenici,
Quayle, Kassenbaum, Boschwitz, Symms and Danforth,
introduced another biennial budget bill, S 416. In many
respects, this bill is quite similar to Senator Roth's
original bill. Senator Domenici 's (ranking minority member
of the Senate Budget Committee) support of the biennial
budget, provided a significant boost to its support [Ref.
20] . It is also interesting to note that Senator Quayle (in
conjunction with Senator Ford) had submitted a biennial
budget bill in the 98th Congress. His support of Senator
Roth's bill, along with the other influential supporters may
signal a growing consensus within the Senate.
The Roth bill would provide for an appropriation for the
full two years. This would be done in the first session of
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a new Congress. The second session would be used for
oversight and review of supplemental legislation on revised
budget estimates submitted by the President (S 416)
.
1st Session 2nd Session
I 1 1
Budget action Oversight
In a summary of the major issues pertaining to biennial
budgeting, GAO selected Senator Roth's proposal as the
preferred alternative if Congress should decide to switch to
a biennial schedule. GAO found this timetable attractive
because it:
- places difficult budget vote in non election years
- allows the budget to be adopted during the first year of
a President's term every other biennium, providing the
opportunity to swiftly implement a new President's
program, and
- leaves the second session of Congress relatively free
for oversight. [Ref. 2: p. 6]
Senator Roth's proposal seems to be the best biennial
budget alternative from DOD's perspective. It provides the
benefit of a two year appropriation while it minimizes the
disadvantages of Congressman Panetta's bill. None of the
bills, however, deal with providing the agency with
increased flexibility in the second year of the biennial
budget. The bills are strictly a systematic approach to
budgeting. They do not, for example address increased
reprogramming or transfer authority thresholds.
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The figures on the following pages are provided to model
the impact that various biennial budget alternatives could
have had on the DOD budget authority requests. The years
chosen to model these effects were FY 1982-FY 1987. Both
line graphs and bar graphs are presented in an effort to
more clearly illustrate the effects of the various biennial
budgeting alternatives.
Figures 1 and 2 model the budget authority (BA) actually
requested by the Administration vs. the budget authority
actually passed by the Congress. It can be seen that from
FY 1982 through FY 1985, the BA passed by Congress lagged
the Presidential request by a fairly consistent amount.
Additionally, throughout these years, the BA requested and
passed increased in a near linear fashion. From 1985
through 1987, the gap between the two lines widens. This
reflects disagreement between the Administration and the
Congress on the size of the Defense budget. It is likely
that if biennial budgeting were in place, agreement between
the Administration and the Congress on the size of a budget
could more easily be reached in a period such as that
experienced between FY 1982 and FY 1985. During periods
when there is a lot of debate on this issue, a biennial
budget could serve to slow the entire budgetary process.
This would be caused by the difficulty encountered in
reaching an agreement on a two year lock-in decision.
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Figures 3 and 4 model a mechanical approach to
budgeting. Though not a viable alternative to current
budgeting methods, it was done to simply study the effects
that such an approach would have on a biennial budget. The
method used was to take the actual BA request made by the
President in the first session of Congress and extending it
to the second session. From FY 1982-FY 1986, it can be seen
that if this approach were taken, the Administration's BA
request in the second session of Congress would lag the
actual request by a significant amount. This reflects the
loss of flexibility in the second year of a biennial budget.
During periods of a rapid buildup in Defense such as that
experienced from FY 1982-FY 1986, this approach would tend
to hold down the rate of growth in the second year of the
biennial budget. By the same token, during periods when DOD
is experiencing cuts in spending, a mechanical approach
could tend to stabilize spending, thus slowing the rate of
decrease and giving the Services more money. The first
trend is evident from 1982-1986 and the second begins to
appear after 1986. From FY 1986-FY 1987, this method
closely approximates the actual BA requested by the
President. This could be expected during periods of stable
spending. In any case, the variability in this mechanical
budget could lead to inefficiency as resources lag or lead
problems. If this approach were taken, it would impact
negatively on program development and sustained growth.
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Figures 5 and 6 model a biennial budget submission by
the President in the first session of the Congress. This
would be the situation provided by the Roth proposal. It
was done by taking the amount the Administration actually
requested in the first session of each Congress and adding
to that the estimated amount of BA request for the
succeeding fiscal year as found in The Budget of the United
States Government , for the next fiscal year. (When a
President submits a budget, he also submits a budget
estimate for the next two fiscal years. To make a biennial
budget, the actual request was combined with the estimated
request for the first year following the Presidential
request.) It can be seen that the slope of the biennial
submission tends to be steeper than that of the actual
request. Agreement on two year lock in decisions are more
difficult to arrive upon however. In view of this it is
likely that the actual slope would be reduced. It can also
be seen that a biennial budget tends to increase the
variability of the budget requests. This would impact
negatively on program stability; a stated advantage of a
biennial budget.
Figures 7 and 8 model a Presidential submission during
the second session of Congress. This would be the case if
the Panetta proposal were to be adopted. These graphs
assume that the President inherited his predecessor's FY
1982 budget and displays one of problems of a multiyear
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budget; the difficulty encountered in being able to rapidly
respond to a change in policy. To make the assumption that
an incoming Administration could significantly alter a
previously authorized and appropriated biennial budget would
again negate a stated benefit of biennial budgeting; program
stability. If Figures 5 and 7 are compared, it can be seen
that the slope of Figure 7 rises more sharply than Figure 5.
It is questionable if an Administration, under normal
circumstances, would actually be successful in pushing this
rate of increase through the Congress.
BUDGET AUTHORITY DATA
FY FIRST SESS SECOND SESS PRES BA REQ PA PASSED
1 82 226. 3 200. 3 226.3 218.7
2 83 259. 6 263. 263.0 245.8
3 84 280. 5 291. 280.5 265.2
4 85 330. 313. 4 313.4 294.7
5 86 322. 2 359. 322.2 281.4
6 87 363..3 320. 3 320.3 284.9
FIRST SESSION FY 82--83 [Ref. 21:pp . 34,99]
FY 84--85 [Ref. 22:p. 5-8]
FY 86--87 [Ref. 23:p. 5-5]
SECOND SESSION FY 82 [Ref. 21:p. 34]
FY 83--84 [Ref. 24:p. 5-10]
FY 85--86 [Ref. 25:p. 5-10]
FY 87 [Ref. 26:p. 5-5]
PRES. BA REQ. FY 82 [Ref. 21:p. 34]
FY 83 [Ref. 24:p. 5-10]
FY 84 [Ref. 22:p. 5-8]
FY 85 [Ref. 25:p. 5-10]
FY 86 [Ref. 23:p. 5-5]
FY 87 [Ref. 26:p. 5-5]
ACTUAL FY 82 [Ref. 22:p. 5-8]
FY 83 [Ref. 25:p. 5-10]
FY 84 [Ref. 23:p. 5-5]
FY 85 [Ref. 26:p. 5-5]
FY 86 [Ref. 27:p. 5-7]
FY 87 [Ref. 28:p. 2581]
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Figure 1. Scatter Graph of Budget Authority Requested
by the President in Each Session of
Congress vs Actual
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Figure 2. Bar Graph of Budget Authority Requested by
the President in Each Session of Congress
vs Actual
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Figure 3. Scatter Graph of Double First Session
President Budget Request vs Actual
President Request
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Figure 4. Bar Graph of Double First Session President
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FY
Figure 5. Scatter Graph of BA Requested by the
President in First Session of Congress
vs Actual President BA Request
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Figure 6. Bar Graph of BA Requested by the President
in First Session of Congress vs Actual
Presidential BA Request
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Figure 7 Scatter Graph of BA Requested by the
President in Second Session of Congress
vs Actual Presidential BA Request
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Figure 8. Bar Graph of BA Requested by the President
in Second Session of Congress vs Actual
Presidential BA Request
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The purpose of this chapter has been to provide a
background to the biennial budget debate. The biennial
budget is gaining support and momentum, within Congress, the
Executive Branch, and DOD. At issue, however, is a specific
definition of a biennial budget. Its definition will
determine what form it takes and what effect it has on DOD.
Within Congress, some members support a biennial budget
because it eases the current budget formulation schedule and
provides more opportunity for oversight. If oversight is
defined to be micromanagement, that would not be of benefit
to DOD. Other members of Congress support the biennial
budget because of the stability and the benefits of economy
of scale that could be realized. Generally speaking, those
that support a biennial budget within DOD see this as its
primary advantage.
The next chapter studies the apparent gradual movement
towards a biennial budget.
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III. THE MOVE TOWARDS A BIENNIAL BUDGET
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses the increasing interest in a
Federal biennial budget. The environment that contributed
to Congressional and Department of Defense interest is
discussed. The movement towards a Federal biennial budget
is then presented beginning with the interest in
streamlining the acquisition process. Proposals to this end
are the Multiyear Procurement Program and funding
acquisition programs on a major milestone basis. The
provisions and the benefits that could be derived from these
programs are presented. This is followed by a discussion of
the reasons for Congress and DOD's interest in a biennial
budget. The chapter concludes with how DOD implemented its
budget submission for FY 1988-1989 and the approach that is
being taken to prepare for the FY 19880-1991 submission.
B. THE ENVIRONMENT
In the late 1970' s and early 1980' s there was a growing
awareness in America that defense spending needed to be
increased. The Soviet military build up combined with their
more aggressive behavior as shown in Afghanistan, Angola,
and the shooting down of a civilian aircraft (Korean
Airlines Fit #007)
,
provided cause for great concern.
During the same period, the United States had been cutting
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back defense spending and had suffered humiliating defeats
in Iran, Nicaragua, and Pakistan (among others) . America
seemed incapable of successfully exerting its influence
overseas. This was particularly frustrating in light of the
Soviet "successes."
In 1980, the Republican party campaigned on this issue.
They perceived that a defense gap existed and that a "window
of vulnerability" would occur in the mid 1980' s. This
urgently needed to be corrected. As a result, the
Republicans lead by Ronald Reagan, pushed for significant
increases in defense spending. The Democrats also supported
increased defense expenditures but to a more limited degree.
President Reagan was ultimately elected and was largely
successful in being able to push his program of increases in
defense outlays, decreases in domestic spending and tax cuts
through the 97th Congress.
As interest in improving our defense posture increased,
efforts to improve and streamline the acquisition process
grew as well. The current authorization/appropriation
process causes much funding level uncertainty from year to
year. Each year, DOD must justify its various programs
before six Congressional committees. Much political gaming
goes on with the end result being funding level uncertainty.
Because of this, virtually every major acquisition program
has experienced funding problems during the procurement
process.
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Clearly, one of the program manager's biggest concerns
is not knowing the level of funding that will be provided
from year to year and milestone to milestone. Funding
requirements and life cycle costs are identified early in
the concept exploration phase and are updated throughout the
acquisition process. As funds are cut (the typical case)
money must be "found" to support the program. This often
entails taking money previously assigned to "lower priority"
or long lead items such as Integrated Logistic Support
(ILS) , and then assigning these funds to more immediate
concerns. This contributes to program instability, loss of
economies of scale, and ultimate deficient funding of those
less immediate but still important concerns.
In this environment, government contractors are
understandably reluctant to make major capital outlay
commitments. A more stable funding horizon may not
eliminate these contractor and program manager concerns. It
could, however, have a significant positive impact on the
problem. This would be done by providing the contractor
with an increased government commitment to a given program
thus reducing the amount of risk the contractor must assume.
More stable funding would also allow the program manager
more time to manage the program effectively and less time
shuffling funds around and being forced to deal with the
advocacy issue.
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Two reforms that have been proposed to help improve
program stability are the Multiyear Procurement Program
(MYP) and the funding of programs on a major milestone
basis. The MYP has been enacted into law by Congress,
however the funding of programs on a major milestone basis
is still in the proposal stage. A biennial budget could
effectively complement both of these measures.
C. MULTIYEAR PROCUREMENT AND MAJOR MILESTONE FUNDING
In 1982, the option to enter into multiyear procurement
contracts for major weapon system programs became available
to DOD. It was a result of a memorandum by then Deputy
Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, establishing 32
initiatives for improving the acquisition process. Though
this option of multiyear procurement had long been available
to DOD, its low contingent liability threshold of $5 million
on the reimbursement of contractor expenses in the event of
contract cancellation, excluded its use in procuring major
weapon systems. The act passed in 1982 raised this
threshold to $100 million making it a viable vehicle to fund
major acquisition programs. [Ref. 29 :p. 16]
The Multiyear Procurement Program (MYP) allows DOD (when
approved by Congress) to enter into contracts for procuring
major weapon systems extending for more than one year but
less than five years. This longer contractual period
reduces funding uncertainties and makes the contractor more
willing to make capital investments and to procure materials
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in economic order quantities [Ref. 29:p. 17]. The savings
resulting from these economies of scale result in lower
contract costs.
Even though the government commits itself to contracts
that extend beyond the fiscal year, the funding is still
done annually. If Congress cuts the program in a subsequent
year, the contract may end up being cancelled. The
cancellation would then cause the government to be liable
for certain contractor unrecovered costs incurred in
conjunction with outyear buys. [Ref. 29 :p. 17]
Not all major weapons procurement programs qualify for
MYP consideration. Specific qualifying criteria were
established by the act. Since 1982, DOD has proposed on
average 10-15 major programs for MYP consideration [Ref.
30] . The restrictive mood of Congress has been a major
obstacle in expanding the use of multiyear contracting for
major programs. This attitude of Congress has contributed
to a reluctance of the Services to propose candidates for
the MYP in the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) . [Ref.
31:p. 4]
The Packard Commission recommended that the use of the
MYP should be expanded and that budgeting for major
acquisition programs on a major milestone basis should also
be employed. The President and Secretary of Defense
Weinberger have also strongly endorsed this concept. Some
have noted that many of the budgetary concepts that are
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necessary for the successful implementation of a biennial
budget are also required for budgeting on a major milestone
basis. In a memo to the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) , R.H. Conn, Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Financial Management) stated that the major milestone
funding "concept meshes nicely with biennial budgeting and,
if implemented properly, would result in economies and
efficiencies" [Ref. 32 :p. 1] . The following description of
major milestone funding was taken from enclosure 2 to this
memo
.
Under a major milestone budgeting program, all ACAT 1
procurement programs would be funded to the next major
milestone. This would apply to all programs projected to
reach milestone I (concept exploration phase) , milestone II
(demonstration and validation phase) or milestone III (full
scale development phase) . Once a program had reached
milestone III, and the full production decision had been
made, the funds for production would be requested on a
normal biennial basis. Where it was deemed to be
appropriate, multiyear procurement authorization would then
be requested.
Under the major milestone budgeting proposal, a budget
estimate would be made for every program projected to reach
the next major milestone. This estimate would be sufficient
to carry that program to the next milestone regardless of
whether that milestone was in the biennial period under
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consideration. The President's budget proposal would
include funds required to complete all phases scheduled to
begin in the biennial period. The graph below is provided
to illustrate a typical major milestone program request in a
biennial budget.
(First Year) (Second Year)
MS MS I MS II
In the case above, the program would be fully funded to
milestone II, sufficient to carry the program through the
concept exploration and the demonstration and validation
phases even though milestone II lies outside the biennial
period. Funding to milestone III would be requested in the
next Presidential biennial budget submission. After the
full production milestone (MS III) had been achieved, the
"normal" biennial budgeting process would begin using MYP
when appropriate. Congress would review programs only at
logical intervals; the major milestones. This process would
contribute significantly to program stability.
In order for major milestone budgeting to be successful,
Congress must authorize programs and appropriate full
funding for the full biennial period. Full funding must be
defined as all the funds required to achieve the next
milestone. Once authorized and appropriated, the programs
should be reviewed by Congress only at the next major
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milestone or if cost, schedule, or performance thresholds
were exceeded.
It is clear that a biennial budget with a single two-
year appropriation could complement both the MYP and funding
on a major milestone basis nicely. Congress, however, has
not shown much interest in streamlining the acquisition
process by limiting its amount of control over DOD. There
are those who are concerned that Congress loses control over
defense spending through the use of the MYP and would lose
even more control if funding on a major milestone basis was
employed. The Congress cannot make annual changes without
incurring penalties. [Ref. 33 :p. 7]
The Defense Department, however, has continued to press
Congress to provide DOD with more flexibility in the
acquisition process in order to realize economies of scale.
Relaxing MYP restrictions, funding programs on a major
milestone basis, and a biennial budget with a two-year
appropriation, are all means to this goal. For some members
of Congress, providing DOD with this increased flexibility
would be too high a price to pay for program stability.
Some of the obstacles then, that stand in the way of easing
the restrictions of the MYP and in implementing funding on a
major milestone basis, stand in the way of a Federal
biennial budget as well.
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D. CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST IN A BIENNIAL BUDGET
Over the years Congress has shown interest in budget
reform measures. Not being an altruistic organization, the
focus of these measures has been to improve the process from
its own perspective. Congress has, in fact, been attempting
to define and refine its role in formulating and overseeing
the Federal budget for many years.
Since the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 there have
been two major changes to the Federal Budget System; the
Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974 and the Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. The Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 was passed primarily because
of the continued failure of Congress to enact timely
appropriations and out of frustration with Presidential
impoundment of Congressionally approved programs. The
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act (Gramm-
Rudman) was passed in response to the size of the federal
deficit and Congressional inability to control deficit
growth. [Ref. 34: pp. 30-31]
Neither one of these reform measures fully achieved
their purpose. The Budget and Impoundment Act succeeded in
restricting the use of Presidential impoundments but
Congress is still unable to pass timely appropriations or to
consider the Federal budget in an organized manner. To date
whatever (if any) deficit reductions accomplished through
the use of Gramm-Rudman has been done by "smoke and
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mirrors." This act may ultimately prove to be an
embarrassment to Congress as they continue to unsuccessfully
manage the budget. Some even argue that Gramm-Rudman is
already dead.
Congressional interest in a Federal biennial budget has
been a relatively recent development however. Some in
Congress view this systematic reform as a possible answer to
the problems that the Budget & Impoundment Control Act of
1974 and the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control
Act of 1985 were unable to correct. The commonly cited
advantages that a biennial budget offers Congress were
identified in Chapter II. The primary ones include schedule
pressure relief, providing Congress more time for non-budget
activities and oversight, and allowing members of Congress
the opportunity to take a broader focus on major policy
issues. In addition to these commonly cited advantages,
there may be other factors that have motivated Congressional
interest in a biennial budget.
It has previously been mentioned that President Reagan
was initially largely successful in getting his program
through the 97th Congress and to a more limited extent than
the 98th Congress. Within Congress there are conservative
members (the right wing) that can be counted upon to support
conservative leadership and liberal members (the left wing)
that are equally consistent in providing opposition.
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Budgeting is a political process, not simply a
systematic one. With each year's Presidential budget
submission to Congress, fundamental policy decisions on the
President's part frame the budget battle that ensues in
Congress [Ref. 4], President Reagan's policy is well known.
His early success can be attributed to being able to sway
public opinion in his favor. By doing so he was able to
gain the support of the portion of Congress that comprises
the "middle of the road."
In 1981, President Reagan moved swiftly to steamroll his
program through Congress. On August 13, 1981, six months
after taking office, he signed a monumental budget cutting
package into law (H.R. 3982) . These cuts were accomplished
through the use of reconciliation. Though reconciliation
had been made available by the Budget Reform Act of 1974, it
had never been used previously. This procedure forces
committees to comply with Congressionally approved spending
levels. [Ref. 35:p. 1464]
Members ' viewpoints on the success of the first use of
reconciliation depended on their political perspective.
Senator Domenici (R-NM) , Chairman of the Senate Budget
Committee, was largely responsible for engineering the use
of reconciliation to accomplish budget cuts. In a speech on
the Senate floor he acknowledged "... that the feelings
around here (the Senate) about reconciliation are mixed."
In the House, Rep. Ted Weiss (D-NY) said "We are voting
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today not on a conference report but on a (budget) process
that is out of control." [Ref. 35:p. 1465]
Some members of Congress were clearly frustrated with
how rapidly President Reagan's sweeping reforms flew through
the 97th Congress. Additionally, Congress had spent most of
their time on budgeting, and less time on oversight and
other legislative matters. Allen Schick, a Congressional
Research Service Budget expert commented, "Behind the
phalanxes of members voting for reconciliation and the
budget resolutions, there is a deep rooted feeling that
something is awry in the legislative process. ..." [Ref.
35:p. 1465]
Both sessions of the 97th Congress finally passed the
Defense authorization acts in late December. Almost three
months past the Congressional "deadline." In view of the
Executive branch's success at pushing through its budget and
Congress' inability to adhere to its own timetable, there
developed a growing realization within Congress that the
budget process required reform.
Some viewed the biennial budget as a possible solution.
There is speculation that if a biennial budget process had
been in place in the 97th Congress. President Reagan may
not have been as successful in pushing his program through
Congress. The Panetta proposal, with its provision for
Congressional budget oversight in the first session and
budget formulation in the second session would have been
58
particularly useful in this respect. In any case, any
budget process that would provide Congress a more systematic
and deliberate process would allow members the opportunity
for more careful consideration.
E. DOD INTEREST IN A BIENNIAL BUDGET
Within DOD there has also been growing support for a
biennial budget but for different reasons than those in the
Congress. Interest seems to have developed after Defense
Secretary Weinberger expressed his support for a biennial
budget. In July 1983 he testified before the Senate Armed
Services Committee stating:
. . . we should also face up to the act that a one year-
budget cycle is no longer adequate to meet the Congress
'
and the Administration's needs. . . . The time has come
for us to consider what has been recommended by a number
of Members of the Congress and the Grace Commission: that
is, that Congress act to provide the Department with a
two-year authorization and a two-year appropriation."
[Ref. 36:encl l:p. 1]
Though there is a consensus that savings can be achieved
through program stability, a means for achieving this has
not been agreed upon. A significant proportion of DOD's
major programs have been reduced below the approved program
baseline even before Congress can begin further de-
stabilizing actions. Within DOD, it is hoped that a
biennial budget can help achieve a more stable funding
horizon with resulting program stability. In its Third
Annual report, the Defense Acquisition Improvement Program
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identified two fundamental obstacles that hinder improving
program stability.
1. Continued reluctance to meet fiscal pressures through
vertical cuts rather than across the board procurement
stretchouts.
2. Continued fluctuations in budget authority.
The Working Group recommended an evaluation of the
feasibility and advisability of pursuing a biennial budget
in order to achieve greater program stability [Ref. 31 :p.
2].
In April 1984, the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) formed a working group under the direction of
the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Program/Budget to study
the various biennial budget alternatives that had been
proposed in Congress and to assess their potential
implications on the Defense budget process. An important
initial consideration was whether DOD should undertake pilot
projects or attempt biennial budgeting on only selected
portions of the defense budget. The working group also
studied the effects that a biennial budget would have on the
PPBS, and how to deal with the requirements for amendments
and supplemental legislation that would be dictated by world
and economic circumstances. [Ref. 36 :p. 1]
A consensus among the services and within DOD about the
potential benefits that a biennial budget offers or how to
implement a biennial budget was not reached. The following
are the positions taken by the Services at the time.
60
The Department of the Air Force favored the adoption of
biennial budgeting. The Air Force cited the major
advantages as being a reduction of Service and DOD workloads
and more timely appropriations by the Congress. The Air
Force also favored a test program to implement the biennial
budget in order to develop an accurate assessment. The Air
Force opposed the Senator Roth version of the biennial
budget because it would change the beginning of the fiscal
year from 1 October to 1 January. This would "serve no
useful purpose and would destroy the continuity of
historical financial data." [Ref. 37 :p. 1]
The Department of the Army generally favored a pilot
project to evaluate the feasibility of a biennial budget and
believed that it should be in a major procurement
appropriation or one of the operating accounts. Though the
Army favored the Roth version of a biennial budget, they
identified three necessary options that were not in any
version. These included "(1) an added year of availability
for appropriated funds, (2) authorization of programs by the
Congress one year in advance of appropriation and (3)
greater flexibility (high thresholds) on reprogramming
authority." [Ref. 38 :p. 1] In the memo, the Army also
stressed the importance of Congress authorizing programs for
two years without making major adjustments in the second
year.
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The Navy took a more cautious attitude towards a
biennial budget. The Navy's position was that since a
Federal budget is a major policy document it is very often
overtaken by economic and world considerations before
Congress has time to act on it. The instability of budget
estimates are a reflection of dynamics of the international,
social, economic and domestic situation. In view of this, a
biennial budget would extend these projections another year
causing an even greater need to revise budget plans during
the execution phase of budgeting. In his memo to the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) , Mr. R.H. Conn
stated, "... the Department has the least flexibility to
change its budget estimates after a budget has been
submitted to the Congress and after the Congress has passed
the initial appropriations act." [Ref. 39 :p. 1] A biennial
budget could, therefore, make it more difficult for the
Services to meet their operational commitments.
As far as a biennial budget's impact on PPBS and the
need for a test program the memo concluded that since the
PPBS process is a multi-year one, the preparation of a two-
year budget would involve only the expansion of the amount
of detail in the budget year to cover two years instead of
one. In light of this, efforts to test how to program and
budget under a biennial process were not needed. If a pilot
project was deemed to be necessary, however, it should be in
a procurement account.
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Within DOD sporadic discussion concerning a biennial
budget continued through 1984 and 1985. Understandably its
specific form or content could not be defined until Congress
provided direction. The Packard Commission's endorsement of
a biennial budget, followed by the President's support,
provided the major impetus. DOD soon became the first
Federal agency to submit a biennial budget.
F. DON'S FIRST BIENNIAL BUDGET SUBMISSION
The FY 1986 Department of Defense Authorization Act
(P.L. 99-145) directed DOD to begin submitting a biennial
budget with the FY 1988-1989 submission. Soon after its
passage, DOD began converting to a biennial budget process.
Within the Navy, it was recognized that a part of the PPBS
process is the preparation of a five year program. In view
of this, the programmatic process to support a biennial
budget was essentially in place. Some mechanical changes to
submit a budget were required, but these could be
accomplished relatively easily [Ref. 40:p. 1]
Converting to a biennial budget was, however,
complicated by the unknown consequences on budgeting that
the then recently passed Gramm-Rudman Act would have. To
further complicate matters, it was the Authorization
committee's mandate to submit a biennial budget. It was not
known (and still remains unknown) how the Appropriations
committees would respond to the biennial budget submission.
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Under these circumstances the Services had to prepare their
respective biennial budgets.
The Navy saw the FY 1988-1989 budget submission as an
opportunity to improve the budgeting process.
In view of the President's and the Secretary of Defense's
positions, the thrust of the authorizing language, and the
Packard Commission recommendations, we should take the
initiative to structure an approach that makes the most
sense from an efficiency and economy point of view . . .
we should develop a proposal that will best serve the
interests of the Department of Defense. To do otherwise
would result in the loss of opportunity that may not be
available again for many years, to direct budget process
changes that would result in the achievement of more
defense programs at lower cost. [Ref. 41: pp. 1-2]
In light of the unique opportunity to reform the
budgeting process and the various uncertainties, the Navy
made several assumptions concerning the nature of the
biennial budget. Many of these assumptions were seen as
being critical for biennial budgeting to succeed. These
assumptions were as follows:
- Each appropriation will cover the requirements for two
years vice two one year appropriations.
All funds for fiscal years 1988/89 would be legally
available on 1 October 1987 for the two-year period
ending 30 September 1989. The alternative would be
two one-year appropriations such that FY 1988 funds
would be legally available from 1 October 1987 through
30 September 1988 and FY 1989 funds would be legally
available from 1 October 1988 through 30 September
1989 . . . all funds must be available at the
beginning of the fiscal period if we are to have
maximum flexibility and achieve the desired economies
and efficiencies under a biennial budgeting process.
- Return to continuing appropriations vice multi-year
appropriations
.
Procurement, R&D, and Military Construction appropria-
tions would be available until expended, rather than
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lapsing after 2, 3, or 5 years as is now the case.
Continuing appropriations provide more flexibility by
allowing the use of unobligated balances for
reprogramming to meet current year requirements.
- All legislative authorities will cover at least the two
year period.
Certain legislative authorities are now made available
on an annual basis (i.e., some bonuses and premium
pays) . The assumption is that they would be
authorized on a two year basis, or made into permanent
law.
- Eliminate restrictive language in appropriations.
We now have appropriation language that sets dollar
floors and ceilings for certain activities, and that
appropriates by line item for some accounts. Such
limitations would have a more detrimental impact on
execution under a biennial budget.
- Eliminate reprogramming thresholds in certain accounts
and provide significant increases in the remainder.
We (DON) would totally eliminate dollar thresholds in
procurement accounts, and increase the thresholds in
the other accounts. Increases in quantities in major
procurement programs would still require reprogramming
action approved by the Congressional oversight
committees. It is critical that reprogramming
thresholds be eased under biennial budgeting.
- Provide unlimited transfer authority.
Since a biennial budget will require more adjustments
between appropriations than an annual budget, and
since any pre-approved limit to transfer authority is
arbitrary, there is really no valid rationale to pre-
establish some amount. It is only necessary to
provide the authority and the mechanism rather than
establishing in law how much it should be.
- Consider supplemental requests on a more timely basis.
Biennial budgeting may require more and larger
supplementals. Late passage of such supplementals
would be even more disruptive than under an annual
cycle.
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- Provide for automatic or supplemental appropriations to
cover increases in inflation.
Given the potentially large variation in costs
relating to inflation under a biennial budget, it is
necessary to establish some procedure to adjust for
changes in inflation estimates. A preferred way would
be to produce automatic increases (or decreases) based
on some accepted index. At the least, we would desire
a routine supplemental request.
- Continue the same Congressional process envisioned under
the Budget Impoundment and Control Act (of 1974) .
The Congress spends only one year—not two
—
passing
appropriations. [Ref. 42: End 2]
In another memo, the Assistant Secretary proposed
several structural changes to improve management and to
streamline the budget process. These changes included
structuring larger account aggregates, combining like items
into single account aggregates, eliminating historical
anachronisms and making other changes to conform to the
DOD's current management structure and philosophy. [Ref.
41:p. 1]
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy went on to say:
The Department is facing an almost unique opportunity to
modify the budget structure and process in a fashion that
will allow us to escape the twin yokes of bureaucratic
inertia and Congressional micro-management. The Secretary
of Defense, the President, and many members of Congress,
all desire to achieve reforms. The Packard Commission has
provided the conceptual underpinnings and the necessary
bipartisan support for reform. It is incumbent upon us,
the technical experts in the budgetary field, to develop
and build the framework that will make these reforms
successful. [Ref. 32 :p. 1]
Within DOD, the decision was made to make separate and
distinct budget estimates for each of the biennial budget
years (FY 1988 and FY 1989) . Unfortunately, the first
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biennial budget submission guidance did not include any of
the major assumptions or recommendations that were made by
the Navy. The estimates for the biennial budget were
justified as independent appropriations. What DOD
essentially did was to take two annual budgets and then
submit them as a biennial budget package. "Only in the
event that there should be subsequent congressional
agreement on rolling the FY 1988 and FY 1989 defense funding
requirements together would we be in a position to consider
combining two fiscal years in any manner. [Ref. 43 :p. 2]
It is extremely unlikely that Congress will appropriate
both fiscal years in the first session [Ref. 44]. As a
result, most of the experts who were interviewed within the
Navy's Budget Office, do not believe that the current
biennial budget submission will achieve any of the desired
improvements in program stability. In addition to this,
from a budgeting perspective, the FY 1988-1989 budget
submission may cause new budgeting problems.
The FY 1989 estimates that were submitted to Congress do
contain the increased uncertainty associated with estimating
budget requirements so far into the future. DOD did not
make any proposals to increase flexibility to work with this
increased uncertainty. Without the necessary flexibility to
make major changes to the FY 1989 budget, the Navy will have
to propose substantial changes to Congress in the form of an
amendment, supplemental, or reprogramming/transfers. The
67
net effect of all this will probably be another FY 1989
budget submission. This will require full justification
before a Congressional committee and will probably take as
much time as if DOD were still operating under an annual
budget. [Ref. 45 :p. 2]
Officially the Navy Budget Office should be
concentrating on developing the FY 1990-1991 biennial
budget. Its specific form and substance cannot be clearly
identified, however, until Congress acts on the first
biennial budget submission. Complicating this task even
more is the unresolved procedure that will be used to update
the FY 1989 requirements currently on the Hill. As it now
stands "the ball is in Congress' court." DOD must adjust
its budgeting process in response to Congress action or
inaction.
F. SUMMARY
The purpose of this chapter has been to present the
relevant issues concerning the biennial budget. It should
be clear that the essential elements that would comprise a
"successful" two-year budget vary depending upon one's
perspective. It is not sufficient to simply favor or oppose
a biennial budget without carefully considering its specific
provisions. There has been movement in the direction of a
biennial budget. Within DOD this interest has been
motivated by an interest in streamlining the acquisition
process and providing a more stable funding horizon. There
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are some within Congress who agree with this. Other
Congressmen simply view a biennial budget as a systematic
reform to help control a budget process that seems to be out
of control.
The recent DOD biennial submission has, however, caused
some changes in how the Navy Budget Office operates. The
POM development process and FYDP update process are the most
noteworthy. The next chapter discusses the impact of some
of these effects.
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IV. THE EFFECTS OF THE MOVE
A. INTRODUCTION
Even though the ultimate form that a Federal biennial
budget may take on has not yet been determined, the FY 1988-
1989 submission by DON has, nevertheless, caused some
changes within the Navy Budget Office. The purpose of this
chapter is to study the effect that these changes have had
at the Navy Budget Office, the Major Claimant, and the
Component Commander level. Most of these changes have
affected the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
(PPBS) and the process to update the Five Year Defense Plan
(FYDP) . Since it is not yet certain how Congress will
respond to the current submission in terms of authorization
and appropriation structure, the biennial budget has
primarily had an impact on the planning and programming
phases of PPBS. The ultimate effect on the budgeting
process will be determined after Congress acts on the
current submission.
It is important to understand what the PPBS is before a
study of the changes that have occurred to the process is
presented. This will be done in the first section of the
chapter. This will be followed by a discussion of the
changes that have occurred to the PPBS as a result of the
biennial budget, how DON developed the FY 1988 POM and how
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it is approaching the FY 1990-1991 POM. This discussion
will include changes in updating the FYDP. The chapter
concludes with the second year review procedures that are
being considered in an attempt to anticipate Congressional
action on the biennial budget.
B. THE PPBS PROCESS
The origin of the PPBS process can be traced to 1961.
It was developed by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara
to facilitate the management of the Department of Defense.
The primary purpose was to tie dollars to defense program
objectives by developing a systematic process by which
resources can be properly allocated to meet unlimited force
requirements. According to Charles Nemfakos,
. . . the purpose of PPBS was to make it possible for the
Secretary of Defense to manage DOD by means of a rational
planning and budgeting process. Its development was an
ambitious undertaking, intended to facilitate budgeting in
terms of military forces and weapons systems instead of
the resource categories of military personnel,
procurement, operation, and maintenance, research, and
construction. In addition, costs were to be determined
for the lifetime of a system, not just for the budget
year. Finally, such data were to be used in analyzing
quantitatively the cost effectiveness and benefits of
alternative programs or systems. [Ref. 34: p. 27]
The PPBS can be summarized in the following manner.
Based on an anticipated threat, a broad strategy to meet the
threat is developed. Requirements to support the strategy
are then estimated and programs are developed to support the
strategy. Finally the specific costs of the approved
programs are then budgeted. [Ref. 46 :p. A-9] The process
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is an iterative one involving the Services, JCS, OSD, and
OMB. A simplified presentation of the purpose and
relationship of each of the three phases of PPBS, planning,
programming and budgeting, will now be described.
In the planning phase, long range threats to the
security of the United States are identified and the
strategy and forces required to counter the threat are
projected. These projections are fiscally unconstrained and
are tied to national policy objectives. The planning cycle
begins with the issuance of the Joint Strategic Planning
Document (JSPD) by the JCS. This document provides the
advice of the JCS to the President and the Secretary of
Defense on the strategy and the force requirements necessary
to meet the existing and projected threat [Ref. 46:p. A-10]
.
The Defense Resources Board (DRB) reviews the force level
requirements identified by the JSPD and issues the Defense
Guidance (DG) . The DG marks the end of the planning phase
and provides the Services with the guidance necessary to
develop the Program Objective Memorandum (POM)
.
The issuance of the DG marks the beginning of the
programming phase of PPBS. The programming phase takes the
long range, fiscally unconstrained, strategic plan
identified in the planning phase and translates it into
fiscally defined, achievable packages. It also narrows the
scope to five years. [Ref. 34 :p. 28]
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The critical document developed by each of the Services
during the programming phase is the Program Objectives
Memorandum (POM). The POM's are prepared by each of the
Services and are done in response to the DG provided by the
Secretary of Defense and the President. The POM expresses
total program requirements in terms of force structure,
manpower, materials and costs needed to support the Five
Year Defense Plan (FYDP) . The POM is the primary means of
requesting changes to the FYDP base which has been
previously approved by the Secretary of Defense. [Ref.
46 :p. A-ll] During the POM development process, Major
Claimants and Component Commanders must project and estimate
their resource requirements for the five year period that
the given POM covers.
Approximately thirty days after the Services publish
their POM's, the JCS issues the Joint Program Assessment
Memorandum (JPAM) . The JPAM is the JCS ' s assessment on the
adequacy of the Services' respective POM inputs. The
Secretary of Defense considers the JPAM analysis while
analyzing the individual Services* POM inputs. The
Programming phase ends with the issuance of the Program
Decision Memorandum (PDM) by the SECDEF. The PDM outlines
the SECDEF decisions in terms of force levels, system
acquisition, and levels of support. [Ref. 46:p. A-13]
The issuance of the PDM marks the beginning of the
budgeting phase of the PPBS process. In this phase, the
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focus of PPBS shifts from mission requirements to dollars.
Emphasis is placed on the first year of the FYDP and on the
executability of programs, the justification requirements,
and on the cost estimates of the programs. [Ref. 34: p. 28]
In the past, the annual budget submission has been made
to the SECDEF twelve months prior to the fiscal year under
consideration. NAVCOMPT issues the call for the submission
of budget estimates in June of the year preceding the budget
under consideration (15 months prior) . Budget estimates are
submitted by the Services to OSD in October. After analysis
of the estimates, SECDEF holds a series of joint budget
hearings with OMB. Following these hearings, SECDEF issues
Program Budget Decisions (PBD) in December. This forms the
budget estimate that OSD submits to OMB for incorporation in
the President's annual budget request that is submitted to
Congress in January of each year. [Ref. 46:p. A-14]
The Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) is the means used to
control the PPBS system. It is a summary of programs
approved by the Secretary of Defense. Under an annual
budget cycle, the FYDP has been traditionally updated three
times during the annual period. This has been done in
October to reflect the DON budget submission to OSD, in
January to reflect the President's budget submission, and in
May to reflect the final POM development. [Ref. 47: p. 1]
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In the past, as program managers have provided their
input to the updating of the FYDP, they have directed their
attention to estimating as accurately as possible the
resource requirements for the first year of the POM. These
estimates are termed "budget quality" figures [Ref . 30] .
Since the outyear estimates must be revised in succeeding
POM inputs in response to the changing threat and
Congressional action, the accuracy of the succeeding years*
estimates were not as critical nor as accurate as the first
year's.
From its implementation in 1961 to the present, the
fundamental PPBS process has not changed. Each succeeding
Administration has made some revisions to the system to
tailor it to their own, unique management style. Under
President Reagan, the shift has been towards an emphasis on
greater decentralization and participative management. The
Secretary of Defense establishes the fiscal guidance but he
delegates much more responsibility and authority to the
Services. POM guidance is less detailed and policy
statements and priorities are broader and emphasize improved
planning [Ref. 34:pp. 29-30]. The implementation of the
biennial budget has, however, caused some systematic changes
to the PPBS process within NAVCOMPT and at the major
claimant level. These effects will be presented in the
following section.
75
C. CHANGES TO THE PPBS PROCESS
A complete assessment of the changes that the PPBS
process will require, cannot be made until it is known how
the Congress and OMB will respond to the biennial budget
submission. Most changes that have already been made are in
the planning and the programming phases. There is a general
consensus within NAVCOMPT, however, that since PPBS was
designed with flexibility in mind and that it has
effectively operated under various management styles for
many years, it can readily be amended to accommodate a
biennial budget.
In a letter to the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) , the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Financial Management/Comptroller of the Navy) identified
the following general impacts on the PPBS that should be
considered if a biennial budget were implemented.
- How to divide the additional year among the planning,
programming and budgeting phases. More time should
probably be allocated to the planning phase since adding
more time to programming and budgeting would have to be
weighed against the increased length of time for which
estimates are made. Increasing the length of time for
which estimates are made increases the uncertainty of
the accuracy of the estimates.
- The degree of detail in the Programming phase must be
reconsidered. A more detailed estimate is of less value
when it covers a longer period of time.
- Consideration must be given to fact of life events and
management initiatives that would cause adjustments to
the budget process. This would occur in both the
formulation and the execution phases. [Ref. 38: pp. 1-2]
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These general considerations identified by the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy, formed the basis for the initial
revisions made to the PPBS process. Most of the additional
year provided by the biennial budget submission has been,
devoted to the planning phase (program appraisal) . In the
programming phase, the POM development schedule has been
amended to accommodate the multiyear process. In the
budgeting phase, there have been some relatively minor
changes within NAVCOMPT. None of the historical budgeting
rules have changed, however, nor have there been any
significant budgeting process changes external to NAVCOMPT
[Ref. 48].
The first change to the PPBS process occurred as DON was
preparing its FY-88 POM. Each year, in September or
October, the Director, General Planning and Programming (0P-
90) , issues POM preparation guidance for the next POM
submission. This letter contains the schedule, the task
areas and sponsor assignments along with their
responsibilities for the preparation of the succeeding POM
input
.
When the POM guidance for POM 88 was issued in September
1985, it was not clear if a two year budget would be
submitted for FY 1988-1989 or if the "normal," annual
budget, would be required. Based on the Congressional
language in the Authorization Committee report, a potential
for a biennial budget submission beginning with the
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President's January 1987 (FY-1988) budget existed [Ref.
47:p. 1]
In light of this, preparation for POM 88 was done with
an awareness that the data for both FY 1988 and 1989 may be
submitted to NAVCOMPT for budget review [Ref. 47 :p. 1] . At
the time, however, even though this "awareness" existed, a
biennial submission was not considered to be a likely
prospect. In addition to this, even if the prospects for a
biennial budget were more likely, there was a limited amount
of time available. The POM preparation schedule was still
under the annual submission cycle. As a result of these
factors, as the Major Claimants prepared for POM-88, their
focus was on FY 88 not FY 89. Designed into the POM-90
schedule, was an opportunity to revise the FY-89
requirements. Ultimately, this update of FY-89 was not
necessary. This will be discussed in greater depth in a
latter portion of this chapter.
In retrospect, of course, a two year budget was
submitted for FY 1988-1989. As a result of the biennial
budget submission, the Department of the Navy has formally
changed the (POM) development cycle from a one year to a two
year POM cycle. There will be no POM-89 and POM-90 will be
due in April 1988 [Ref. 49]. The primary impact on the
Major Claimant and the Component Commander of changing the
POM cycle to a two year cycle, is that it has shifted the
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focus on the first two years of the POM, requiring budget
quality estimates for both years [Ref. 30].
The first year of the POM preparation cycle (called the
off-year) is now devoted to the planning phase of PPBS.
This provides more opportunity for warfare appraisal. Under
the annual cycle warfare appraisals were compressed into
three months. This caused the planning and programming
phases focus to be on the first year of the POM. With the
two year cycle, the warfare appraisal has been spread over
six months in the offyear. This provides more time for
analysis and the development of a coherent program for the
entire POM period under consideration (FY 1990-1994)
.
Figures 9 and 10 illustrate the changes to the PPBS time
schedule. They were provided by OP-090. Figure 9 provides
a comparative look at the two different POM preparation
cycles. Figure 10 presents how the additional time has been
allocated to the planning, programming and budget phases of
PPBS.
Figure 9 also reflects another important revision to the
PPBS process; the frequency of updating the FYDP. Recall
that the FYDP is the PPBS 1 controlling mechanism. It can be
expected then, that any changes to the PPBS schedule would
most likely cause changes to the FYDP updating process.
This has occurred as follows. Under the new system, the
FYDP will be updated in October 1986 to reflect the DON
budget submission to OSD and in January 1987 to reflect the
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President's FY 88-89 budget submission to Congress. A third
FYDP update is tentatively planned in August 1987 after the
FY 88-89 budget amendment has been completed. The fourth
FYDP update will be performed in January 1988 after OSD has
completed their review of the FY 1988-1989 budget amendment.
The fifth FYDP update will occur in May 1988 following the
final submission of POM 1990-1994 [Ref. 50:p. 12].
There have not been any fundamental revisions to the
overall FYDP process as a result of the biennial budget
submission. The changes that have occurred have been
primarily superficial revisions to accommodate the new time
schedule without fundamentally changing the PPBS process.
Future revisions will be made as deemed necessary by OSD.
For example it is currently anticipated that the August 1987
update may slide to the October/November 1987 timeframe
[Ref. 49]. Though this is likely a significant change to
those involved in updating the FYDP, it is not likely to
have any fundamental impact on the overall PPBS process.
The POM-90 preparation is being done with an awareness
that a FY 89 program adjustment may be needed. Whatever
form it takes, there will be two opportunities for Navy
Component Commanders, Major Claimants, and Resource Sponsors
to update their programming requirements during the current
cycle.
The first occurred in February 1987 and consisted of a
limited number of macro-level concerns. These inputs were
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to be used by the Resource Sponsors in developing Planned
Program Changes (PPC's) for proposed adjustments for FY-89
and requirements for FY 90-92. The process used was to have
the Major Claimants and the Component Commanders identify
their top five programmatic concerns. These prioritized
issues were then submitted to the Resource Sponsors for
review. Any emerging or previously unidentified issues were
to be incorporated into PPB's by the Resource Sponsors in
order to adjust the FY-89 requirements.
As it turned out, there were no emerging programming
requirements identified in the review conducted by the
Resource Sponsors. All of the prioritized issues had been
previously identified and incorporated in the preceding POM-
88 input. As a consequence no PPC's were prepared and no
adjustments to the FY-89 programming requirements were made
[Ref. 49].
The second opportunity to adjust the programming
requirements will be a detailed input for POM 90 (FY 1990-
1994). This will be submitted in October 1987. In this
case, the number of major issues Major Claimants may submit
to the Resource Sponsors is not limited. The focus,
however, should again be on the top five major issues.
[Ref. 50:p. 12]
Though a schedule to review the programming requirements
has been established and is being adhered to, it is more
difficult to determine what process will be used to update
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the budget that is already on Capitol Hill. Theoretically,
if Congress appropriates both FY 1988 & 1989, and if there
were no emerging requirements, an update would not be
necessary. This is unlikely in both respects. An update
will almost certainly be required and its form will be
determined in response to Congressional action. An
adjustment to the FY-89 submission could range from a FY-89
budget amendment or a complete, new FY 89 budget submission.
NAVCOMPT remains in a reactive mode to Congressional action
or inaction.
As a result of this uncertainty, the second year budget
review procedures for the current biennial budget submission
have not been finalized. It is likely that any emerging
requirements will be submitted as an amendment to the FY-89
budget request. In anticipation of this, NAVCOMPT is
currently planning an apportionment review in the summer of
1987. This review will focus on FY 88 and 89 budget
requirements [Ref. 48].
Some indication of Congressional response to the DOD
biennial budget submission has already been provided. To
date, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) has
authorized programs for FY 88. They have also conditionally
authorized approximately 20% of the R&D request made by DON
for FY 89 and approximately 10% of the major procurement
request. The condition is that these selected FY 89
programs must be appropriated this year by the
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Appropriations Committee. If they are not, the
authorization is rescinded. The HASC bill also included
language saying that this was a first step towards a
biennial budget with possibly a more substantial one to be
made in the following year [Ref . 48]
.
The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) has not yet
reported its authorization bill. If it authorizes programs
for only FY 88 and does not authorize any programs for FY
89, the prospects for a biennial budget for FY 88-89 appear
to be dead. If it takes some action similar to the HASC, a
biennial budget in a partial form may be passed. In any
case, in light of the HASC action, a full, two year
appropriation is extremely doubtful.
D. SUMMARY
It had been generally recognized that while DOD would
have the most influence on any changes to the planning and
programming phases that a biennial submission would
necessitate, any changes to the budgeting phases would be in
response to the actions of Congress and OMB. This has
proven to be the case as can be seen by the changes to the
PPBS process that have been made to date. The ultimate
impact, however, that the biennial budget will have on PPBS
or on budgeting in general, will not be known until Congress
takes final action on the biennial budget issue. PPBS was
implemented with flexibility in mind. It has responded to
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changes in the past and there is no reason to believe that
it cannot respond to a biennial budget.
The purpose of this chapter has been to identify the
major changes that have occurred within the Navy Budget
Office as a result of the FY 1988-1989 biennial budget
submission. It can be seen that most of these changes have
been in the planning and programming phases of PPBS. The
overall, net long term effect has yet to be determined.
In the next chapter, conclusions regarding a biennial
budget will be drawn.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
An increasing percentage of people are becoming more and
more frustrated with the current budget process. Support
for reforming the process is coming from a variety of
segments that form our political population; segments that
generally have difficulty agreeing on controversial issues.
Members of Congress, the Administration, and others involved
in the budget process are all calling for budget formulation
reform.
There is no doubt that the current process is a
cumbersome one. With few exceptions, each year, members of
Congress are caught in an eleventh hour crisis. They find
themselves not prioritizing national issues by developing a
budget but rather attempting to pass a budget to save the
government from bankruptcy. Most members end up voting on a
budget package whose contents they are not familiar with.
The time consuming process requires a disproportionate share
of each member's time and is often done at the expense of
other important issues.
Those involved in formulating the budget within the
Executive Branch (OMB and the agencies) spend months
developing their respective inputs to the Federal budget.
Months are then spent defending their requests before at
least six different Congressional committees. After all
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this, indiscriminate cuts are then often made by committees,
in action on the floor or in meeting last minute deadlines,
sometimes well after the FY has begun. Funding level
uncertainty results causing program instability with
resulting losses in efficiency and economies of scale.
Some see the biennial budget as the answer to the
problem. A biennial budget would, if nothing else, provide
more time to review a budget and could reduce the number of
continuing resolutions. Depending upon its specific form
and definition, however, it could offer much more to the
Administration, the Congress, and the agency. The
perception that more time will lead to a more thoughtful and
a more deliberative process, is what seems to be behind the
current support for a multiyear budget.
There is a tendency to use the term "biennial budget"
loosely. Depending upon one's perspective, however, its
definition takes on a different meaning. Within Congress,
for example, some view a biennial budget as a means to
achieve program stability and to realize greater efficiency,
while others view it as a systematic change allowing greater
opportunity for Congressional oversight.
A biennial budget could be of great benefit to the
Department of Defense particularly if it were used as a
vehicle to complement major milestone funding and the MYP.
Recall that while developing this FY 1988-1989 budget
submission, DON made key assumptions that were considered
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critical in order for a biennial budget to be successful
(Chapter III) . As Congress considers the DOD submission,
however, none of these assumptions are being considered.
For example, one of the key requirements was that Congress
needed to authorize and appropriate both fiscal years under
consideration. That this is most likely not going to be the
case is evidenced by completed HASC action. At best, only a
relatively small portion of the overall budget has been
authorized and may be appropriated. If this partial measure
is appropriated it could complicate the process even further
from a budget formulation and execution perspective.
It was the Authorizing Committees' bill that required a
biennial budget submission from DOD. The Appropriations
Committees did not support it. The Appropriations
Committees, in fact, are opposed to biennial appropriations
seemingly because it would cause them to lose power and
influence. Under the current system, they can "hold the
attention of the Executive Branch" each year as opposed to
every other year. Without public pressure, it is unlikely
that they will change this view.
In addition, any budget reform measure that Congress
enacts, will change the process to correct the problems as
seen from their perspective. It is doubtful that they will
amend the process to benefit DOD. While conducting research
for this thesis, the author asked a Congressman's aide if
Congress was likely to amend the process to adjust for the
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increased flexibility that a biennial budget would require
from a budget administrator's perspective. He replied, "If
an EPA official came up here and said 'we have problems with
executing and estimating a two year budget'; our response
would be 'that is not our concern'."
Simply changing the budget cycle from a one year to a
two year cycle will not cause budget formulation reform. It
would have no more effect on the efficiency of the process
than did the Budget Reform Act of 1974. To be an effective
instrument, the Congress, the Executive Branch and the
agency must reach a consensus on the key changes that need
to be incorporated into the entire process and would have to
accompany a shift to a multiyear cycle. Changes, for
example, are needed to account for the requirement for an
increase in flexibility in executing the budget.
In addition to this, a biennial budget would serve no
useful purpose if it were simply two one year budgets under
a different name. This is exactly what OSD did in making
its FY 1988-1989 submission. Presumably, the reasons for
this form rather than a single biennial package, was the
uncertainty of Congress' response to the first biennial
budget consideration. Two one year budgets are more easily
dissected than a single package and if Congress did not
authorize and appropriate both years, the second year could
more readily be resubmitted.
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By taking this approach, however, DOD lost an
opportunity to help restructure the budget process from
DOD's perspective. By submitting two one year packages, DOD
made it convenient for Congress to single out each year of
the package and consider it separately. This precludes the
achievement of the major advantage that a multiyear budget
would provide; program funding level stability. Budget
estimates for FY 1989 contain significant uncertainty
because they were developed in 1986, without provisions or
proposals to provide for increased flexibility. As a
consequence, the Administration will likely find it more
difficult to adjust the FY 1989 program content or its
topline.
The FY 1988-1989 DOD biennial budget submission seems to
minimize the advantages and maximize the disadvantages of
what a biennial budget offers. It has caused some changes
to the way the PPBS process operates and other internal
changes within NAVCOMPT but it has not caused any noticeable
changes to the way business is conducted on Capitol Hill.
Until there is sufficient public pressure to bring about
change, it is doubtful that Congress will make significant
changes to the way funds are currently authorized and
appropriated. A biennial budget without most of the
characteristics identified in Chapter III would probably be
an unsuccessful reform measure. As a result, the
effectiveness of a biennial budget without these
91
characteristics as a means to achieve the cited advantages
it offers is quite doubtful.
The biennial budget, however it will ultimately be
defined, is gaining influential support. Over the next few
years, it is likely to continue to evolve. This study was
limited by the current nature of the subject. A suggested
topic for further research is to continue tracking the
biennial budget and the effect that it causes on budget
formulation procedures within NAVCOMPT.
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